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 This article characterizes necessary and sufficient conditions for heterogeneous search
 goods to trade at their competitive prices, and derives policy implications from these
 conditions. The model differs from earlier search equilibrium models in that it allows
 the existence of product heterogeneity. Our principal conclusions are that markets for
 heterogeneous search goods tend rather easily to segment into homogeneous subsets;
 when they do not, heterogeneity can work against the existence of competitive equilibria
 because it dilutes the effectiveness of search. Nevertheless, the likelihood of competitive
 equilibria obtaining in heterogeneous search goods markets can often be increased by
 reducing the costs to consumers of directly comparing purchase alternatives.
 1. Introduction
 * For over a decade, the federal government has responded aggressively to apparent
 information imperfections in consumer markets. Examples of such responses include the
 Truth in Lending Law, the Magnusson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Im-
 provement Act, the Consumer Leasing Act, and the Real Estate Settlement Procedures
 Act. Congress has passed almost all of this regulation with no clear idea of what purposes
 it wanted to achieve, or could in fact achieve, or of the relation between various inter-
 vention strategies and the possible goals of government action. As a normative matter,
 imperfect information should be relevant to decisionmakers because high search costs
 can prevent markets from reaching competitive equilibria. The state thus should intervene
 in markets on information grounds only when noncompetitive outcomes obtain; and
 regulation should be directed to increasing the likelihood of competitive behavior.'
 An important positive task that this normative analysis makes germane is to char-
 acterize the conditions under which competitive outcomes can obtain in environments
 where information is costly to acquire. Previous work dealing with this problem commonly
 modeled markets for homogeneous search goods-identical products, all of whose fea-
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 tures consumers could observe before purchase. This work has increased understanding
 of how markets characterized by costly information behave, but it apparently has limited
 relevance to decisionmakers, for the conclusions that the earlier models reach apply
 directly only to such products as money or wheat.2 This article extends previous analyses
 by considering competitive equilibria in markets for heterogeneous search goods.
 Consumers in the model developed below shop pursuant to a fixed sample size
 strategy in a market that potentially supplies a search good at two qualities, "low" and
 "high." Although these consumers have preferences for low or high quality goods, they
 have imprecise information, when they begin to search, as to where either good can be
 found or what prices they are likely to face. Thus, consumers shop randomly across
 quality levels. The firms pursue relatively passive strategies, in that they do not advertise,
 but instead experiment with prices, changing them when changes would increase expected
 profits. We derive necessary and sufficient conditions for an equilibrium to obtain in
 which both the low and the high quality goods trade at their competitive prices.
 Surprisingly, the earlier homogeneous search goods models turn out to have con-
 siderable generality because markets for high and low quality goods often will "segment,"
 for two reasons. First, segmentation will occur unless consumers who prefer low quality
 goods will buy high quality goods that trade at their competitive price if the consumers'
 search reveals only high quality goods; if these consumers would not purchase high
 quality goods in this circumstance, they actually are shoppers only for low quality.
 Similarly, the two markets will segment unless consumers who prefer high quality goods
 will buy low quality goods that trade at their competitive price if the consumers' search
 reveals only low quality goods; if these consumers would not purchase low quality goods
 in this circumstance, they actually are shoppers only for high quality. If these conditions
 fail, low and high quality goods will trade in distinct markets. To see more vividly the
 restrictiveness of these conditions, consider the market for compact cars. Unless the
 consumers who shop in it and who prefer a BMW or a Mercedes are willing to purchase
 a Toyota or a Datsun that trades at its competitive price if the consumers' search fails
 to reveal a high quality dealer, the compact car market will segment.
 Second, segmentation will occur unless the additional cost of producing high rather
 than low quality goods-the "marginal cost of high quality"-exceeds the marginal
 willingness of low quality preferers to pay for high quality goods, but is less than the
 marginal willingness of high quality preferers to pay for them. This results because if
 the marginal cost of high quality exceeded the marginal willingness to pay for it of both
 sets of consumers, everyone would buy low, while if the marginal cost of high quality
 was less than the marginal willingness to pay for it of both sets of consumers, everyone
 would buy high. No compelling reason exists, however, for the marginal cost of high
 quality goods always to exceed the marginal willingness to pay for them of one set of
 consumers but not the other. This second condition for the two markets to interact seems
 more difficult to satisfy than the first, but the first is nontrivial; and it often will be the
 case that one or both of these conditions will not be met, so that market segmentation
 is plausible for search goods. Thus, models that presuppose product homogeneity have
 applicability to a fairly wide range of cases.
 This conclusion has normative significance as well, because the principal factor
 causing homogeneous goods markets to behave competitively is the extent of comparison
 shopping, and it apparently takes less comparison shopping to generate competitive
 outcomes than had previously been supposed (Schwartz and Wilde, 1979). On the other
 hand, when the markets for low and high quality goods do interact, product heterogeneity
 can work against the existence of competitive equilibria because heterogeneity dilutes
 the effectiveness of search. Prices are driven down to competitive levels in search equi-
 2 Many of these papers are reviewed in Schwartz and Wilde (1982).
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 librium models as a result of competition among firms for shoppers. Suppose, however,
 that some consumers who shop twice visit one high and one low quality firm. These
 consumers effectively are nonshoppers in both markets. In consequence, if as much
 shopping occurs in a heterogeneous as in a homogeneous goods market, firms in the
 former market may face fewer actual comparison shoppers and thus be more likely to
 find it profitable to deviate from the competitive price. Further, if the number of shoppers
 in one of the markets is increased, many of these new shoppers may "spill over" into
 the other market-that is, visit one or more firms that sell the less preferred quality. In
 certain cases, this loss of shoppers could actually cause a market to behave less compet-
 itively than before search costs in it were reduced.
 Section 2 sets out the formal model and derives conditions for when the markets
 for low and high quality goods will interact. Sections 3, 4, and 5 derive necessary and
 sufficient conditions for when competitive equilibria will obtain in both markets and
 explain the intuition underlying these conditions. Section 6 then briefly discusses the
 policy implications and limitations of the analysis. In particular, we show that reducing
 the costs to consumers of directly comparing purchase alternatives is likely to lower
 noncompetitive prices. On the other hand, it is difficult for decisionmakers to identify
 the cases when information problems are likely to yield noncompetitive prices in het-
 erogeneous goods markets. Because knowing this is a prerequisite to intelligent regulation,
 much room for further research remains.
 2. A search equilibrium model with heterogeneous goods
 * This section develops a model for a heterogeneous search good-one described by
 price and "quality" but all of whose features are observable before purchase. This good
 is supplied at two quality levels, "low" and "high," the adjectives low and high actually
 being conventions; the formal model requires only that the two goods be differentiated
 members of the same (narrowly defined) product class.
 The technology associated with producing the low quality good is described by a
 fixed cost, FL, a constant marginal cost, CL, and a capacity constraint on firm size, SL.
 Similarly, the technology associated with producing the high quality good is described
 by a fixed cost, FH, a constant marginal cost, CH, and a capacity constraint on firm size,
 SH. The capacity constraint is an analytically convenient substitute for the usual as-
 sumption of U-shaped average cost curves. In this model, P* = CL + (FL/SL) and pH
 = CH + (FH/SH) thus become the "competitive" prices associated with the two quality
 levels. The only assumption we make regarding the relationship between the two tech-
 nologies is that the competitive prices differ; we here suppose that p* < pH. Each firm
 offers either the low quality good or the high quality good. The total number of firms
 is N, with NL firms selling low quality goods and NH firms selling high quality goods.
 We define nL = NL/N and nH = NH/N. Firms do not advertise, but charge a price, wait
 to see who buys, and alter prices when this would increase expected profits.
 Each consumer in the market lives for one period, demands one unit of the low
 quality good or one unit of the high quality good (but not both), and either purchases
 or gets a raincheck at the end of the period if he or she finds a firm whose price is
 acceptable. Consumers are partitioned in two distinct ways, according to those who shop
 and those who do not and according to those who "prefer" low quality and those who
 "prefer" high. The nature of this preference for quality is made clear below, but now
 let A1 be the number of nonshoppers and A2 be the number of shoppers, where A1 > 0
 and A2 > 0. Also, let AtL be the number of nonshoppers who prefer low quality and
 A2 be the number of shoppers who prefer low quality. Using a similar notation for high
 quality, we have AL = A L + A L and AH = A H + As'.
 All consumers actually search pursuant to a fixed sample size strategy, in accord-
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 ance with which each consumer creates a preset sample of firms before he or she begins
 to shop, and then exhausts this sample during search.3 For some consumers-the "non-
 shoppers"-the sample size is one; for the others-the "shoppers"-the sample size is
 n, with n restricted to two for expositional convenience. Shoppers thus sample precisely
 two firms at random across both quality levels before purchasing. This shopping pattern
 is one of a set of sufficient conditions that allows the markets for the two quality types
 to interact.4
 Suppose that if offered the opportunity to buy the goods at their competitive prices,
 denoted (p*, pH), members of AL would buy the low quality good and members of AH
 would buy the high quality good. Next let the price of the low quality good remain fixed
 at p*, but the price of the high quality good rise. Members of AL would still want the
 low quality good, but members of AH at some point would switch from buying high to
 buying low quality. Let P-H be the price for the high quality good at which these latter
 consumers are just indifferent to switching. Similarly, suppose there is a price P-L > p*
 such that, if offered the opportunity to buy the goods at prices (PL, PH), members of AL
 will buy low quality if PL < PL and high quality if PL > PL.
 Consumers also have "limit prices" for both quality levels. If no high quality goods
 were available, IL is the maximum price that a consumer who prefers low quality would
 pay for the low quality good and hL is the maximum price that a consumer who prefers
 high quality would pay for this good. Similarly, if no low quality goods were available,
 IH is the maximum price that a consumer who prefers low quality would pay for the
 high quality good and hH is the maximum price that a consumer who prefers high quality
 would pay for this good.
 The significant point respecting these limit prices is that since consumers are as-
 sumed to buy only one unit of the good, the difference between the limit price for a
 quality type and the purchase price of that quality type measures consumer surplus. This
 enables our assumptions concerning consumers' tastes for quality to be translated into
 constraints on the relationship between limit prices and competitive prices. We have
 already assumed that P-L > pL* and P-H > pH. It is also realistic to require the price that
 will induce consumers who prefer low quality to switch to high quality (given that high
 quality can be purchased at its competitive price) to be less than or equal to the maximum
 price consumers will pay for low quality rather than forego the good; and the price at
 which consumers who prefer high quality will switch to low quality (given that low
 quality can be purchased at its competitive price) to be less than or equal to the maximum
 price they will pay for high quality rather than forego the good. These assumptions yield
 two constraints on P-L and P-H
 PL < PL < IL, (1)
 PH <PH ? hH. (2)
 Using our notion of consumer surplus, we have by definition: IL - PL = IH - PH-
 Rearranging this expression gives an analytical definition of PL:
 PL IL IH + PH * (3)
 3 We have explained elsewhere why consumers might use fixed sample size strategies. See Wilde and
 Schwartz (1979); Schwartz and Wilde (1979).
 4 An alternative shopping pattern that would also allow the markets for the two types of goods to interact
 would arise if consumers were aware of the quality each firm offered but not its price, if they would buy either
 type of good if offered the opportunity to do so at its competitive price, and if they chose deliberately to shop
 across quality levels to compare price-quality tradeoffs. We rule out a "cross-quality" shopping pattern in this
 article for two reasons. First, it is to some extent inconsistent with the model's formal assumption that consumers
 learn about prices and qualities only by direct sampling of firms. Second, the random shopping strategy has
 fairly broad application because low and high quality refer, as said above, only to differentiated members of
 the same (narrowly defined) product class.
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 Analogously, hH - PH = IL - p*, or
 PH hH hL +PL* (4)
 Substituting (3) and (4) into (1) and (2) yields:
 PL* < IL - IH + PH < IL, (5)
 PH < h- hL + PL < hH (6)
 The right-hand inequalities in (5) and (6) reduce to pA I IH and pL* hL. If these
 inequalities are not satisfied, the markets will necessarily segment-consumers who prefer
 low quality will never buy high quality and consumers who prefer high quality will never
 buy low quality.5
 The left-hand inequalities in (5) and (6) can be summarized as
 IH IL < PH- PL* < hH- hL. (7)
 The terms IH - IL and hH- hL are interpreted as the marginal willingness to pay for
 high quality by consumers who prefer low quality and consumers who prefer high quality,
 respectively. For the two markets to interact, this premium must be less than the marginal
 cost of high quality in competitive equilibrium for consumers who prefer low quality and
 greater than the marginal cost of high quality in competitive equilibrium for consumers
 who prefer high quality. While it may be realistic for low quality preferers to have a
 lower marginal willingness to buy high than high quality preferers do, no compelling
 reason exists for the two marginal willingnesses to pay often to have the peculiar rela-
 tionship to the marginal cost of high quality that equation (7) requires. Thus, this
 constraint also suggests that segmentation is plausible.
 Finally, equilibrium in this model is defined by a total consumer firm ratio, A/N,
 a distribution of firms across the two quality levels, (nL, nH), and a distribution of prices
 for each quality level such that (a) all consumers pursue specified shopping strategies,
 (b) given the equilibrium distribution of firms across the two quality levels, all firms earn
 zero expected profits, and (c) no firm can earn positive profits by changing its price offer
 or its quality level.6
 3. Necessary and sufficient conditions for a competitive
 equilibrium 1: balancing constraints
 * In a heterogeneous search goods model, two types of necessary and sufficient con-
 ditions are required to ensure that a competitive equilibrium exists. The first are derived
 by asking whether deviating from the competitive price would be a profitable strategy
 for any firm; the second are derived by asking whether expected demand equals capacity
 in the market for each type of good. The latter "balancing constraints" are developed
 in this section.
 Suppose initially that all firms charge competitive prices and that NL and NH are
 given. To calculate expected demand for low and high quality firms, first realize that
 5 We argued above that these conditions are strong, but we do not want to overstate the point. If consumer
 preferences for quality are heterogeneous, then some consumers might exist at the tail of the distribution of
 those who prefer low quality who would purchase high quality if they saw only it, and similarly for the
 distribution of those who prefer high quality. The importance of such "spillovers" is an empirical question.
 6 Under full information, the classical competitive equilibrium would satisfy these conditions. Because
 consumers can spill over into markets for less preferred goods, the model above permits only a "pseudo-
 competitive" equilibrium, in which firms earn zero profits and each good trades at its competitive price (p*,
 pA). In such an equilibrium, nL need not equal AL/SL and NH need not equal AHISH; that is, an excessive number
 of firms may exist. For convenience, we use the phrase "competitive equilibrium" to refer to an equilibrium
 of this sort.
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 all firms get an equal share of the nonshoppers, A1/N, but do not get an equal share of
 the shoppers, even though no price dispersion exists within quality levels. Members of
 A' who sample two firms offering the high quality good will buy from one of them at
 random. Those who sample one firm offering the low quality good and one firm offering
 the high quality good will buy the low quality good. Those who sample two firms offering
 the low quality good will buy from one of them at random. Members of A' behave
 similarly.
 To calculate expected demand for firms offering the low quality good, first suppose
 that a member of A' samples a firm offering the low quality good. The probability that
 this consumer buys from the firm is equal to the probability that his or her other ob-
 servation is from a firm offering the low quality good times one-half plus the probability
 that his or her other observation is from a firm offering the high quality good; i.e.
 [(NL/N)(1/2) + (NH/N)].7 The probability that a member of A2 samples any given firm
 is 2/N, because shoppers sample precisely two firms. Hence expected demand from
 members of A2 is
 AL(2/N)[(NL/N)(1/2) + (NH/N)] = (A L/N)[(NL/N) + (2NH/N)].
 A similar analysis shows that expected demand from members of A2 is
 A!(2/N)(NL/N)( 1/2) = (AfH/N)(NL/N).
 In consequence, total expected demand at firms offering the low quality good is
 DL = (A L/N)[(NL/N) + (2NH/N)] + (A /N)(NL/N) + (AI/N).
 Similarly,
 DH= (A H/N)[(NH/N) + (2NH/N)] + (A L/N)(NH/N) + (A /N).
 The zero-profit constraint implies that DL = SL, and DH = SH in competitive equi-
 librium because demand persistently greater than capacity implies that entry is profitable,
 while demand persistently less than capacity implies negative profits or noncompetitive
 prices. This analysis yields the following necessary condition for a competitive equilib-
 rium:
 (A1/N) + (A L/NL)[ 1 - (NH/N)2] + (A H/NL)(NL/N)2 = SL
 (A1/N) + (A H/NH)[1 - (NL/N)2] + (A L/NH)(NH/N)2 = SH.
 Solving for NL and NH, we have8
 NL= [A(SL - SH) - SH(A2 - A )](SL - SH)2 (8)
 NH = [SL(AA - A2 ) - A(SL - SH)]/(SL - SH)2 (9)
 Equations (8) and (9) imply that
 N = (A2 - A )/I(SL - SH). (10)
 We require NL ? 0 and NH ? 0. From (8) and (9), these constraints are equivalent to
 SL(A2 - AH ) > A(SL - SH) ? SH(A2 - A2 ). (11)
 Condition ( 11) does not guarantee that the competitive equilibrium will occur, but
 does establish constraints on the mix of shoppers and nonshoppers that must be associated
 7 The text assumes sampling with replacement, because with a large number of firms the inaccuracy
 vanishes and calculations are easier. This is the standard approach in the search literature.
 8 The details of this and several other derivations are found in the appendix to Schwartz and Wilde (1981).
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 with a proper balance of firms offering each good for a competitive distribution of firms
 to be an equilibrium. These balancing constraints are strong. For example, equation (10)
 shows that for a competitive equilibrium in both markets to exist, the difference between
 the number of shoppers who prefer the low quality good and the number of shoppers
 who prefer the high quality good must have the same sign as the difference between the
 capacity constraint for firms offering the low quality good and the capacity constraint
 for firms offering the high quality good. This condition is necessary because firms with
 large capacity need to attract more consumers in competitive equilibrium than firms
 with small capacity. If capacity constraints are roughly similar-SL is not much greater
 than SH-but A L is considerably larger than A', a competitive equilibrium could still
 occur through adjustments in the proportions of firms: nL will increase and nH will decline.
 These adjustments, however, could never overcome an absolute advantage in the opposite
 direction of the capacity constraints, because each firm has an inherent advantage in
 attracting those shoppers who prefer its own quality level. Thus, if SH > SL, while
 A2L> Af, firms which offer high quality goods would experience persistent excess capacity.
 4. Necessary and sufficient conditions for a competitive
 equilibrium II: breaking constraints
 * We wish to characterize conditions under which the competitive pair (p*, p*) is
 stable with respect to individual firms raising their prices. A firm that deviates from the
 competitive equilibrium has several pricing options, with the profitability of each de-
 pending on the relationships between switch prices and limit prices in the relevant market.
 Because the derivation of these breaking constraints is similar in the various cases, we
 shall do one case in detail, simply setting forth the results of the others.
 O Deviations by low quality firms. Suppose that all high quality firms charge pH and
 all low quality firms except one charge p*. The deviant firm has three pricing options,
 to charge PL, 1L, or hL-
 Case LI: pL* < hL < PL < IL. A firm selling the low quality good that raises its price to
 hL will lose only those shoppers who have sampled both it and another firm offering the
 low quality good, regardless of whether they prefer low quality or high quality. The firm
 retains all nonshoppers and those shoppers who prefer low quality and sample one firm
 offering the low quality good and one firm offering the high quality good. Expected
 profits become
 7rL(hL) = [(A1/N) + 2(A L)/N)(NH/N)](hL - CL) -FL
 The competitive distribution at (p*, pH) is an equilibrium if expected profits from de-
 viating (in this case charging hL) are nonpositive; that is, if
 (A1/N) + 2(A/LIN)(NHIN) < FL/(hL - CL)
 Recall that nL = NL/N and nH = NH/N. Let s = nLSL + nHSH be "average" capacity
 under a competitive distribution. Then the constraint requisite for a competitive equi-
 librium is
 a, + 2aLnH < FL/S(hL - CL), (12)
 where a, = A1/A and a2L = AL/A.
 Now suppose the deviant firm raises its price to PL. In this case it loses, in addition
 to shoppers who have sampled another low quality firm, those nonshoppers who prefer
 high quality, because PL > hL. Expected profits become
 lrtQ(PL) = [(A1/N) + 2(A2/N)(NH/N)](ftL - CL) - FL.-
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 The associated constraint requisite for a competitive equilibrium is
 al + 2aLnH < FL/S(PL - CL), (13)
 where a L = A4/LA.
 Finally, suppose that the deviant firm raises its price to IL In this case, it loses all
 shoppers and those nonshoppers who prefer high quality, because IL > hL. Expected
 profits become
 wt (IL) = (AL/N)(IL - CL) - FL.
 The associated constraint requisite for a competitive equilibrium is
 al ? FL/(IL - CL) (14)
 A low quality firm would have no incentive to depart from the competitive price in
 case LI only if equations (12), (13), and (14) all hold.
 Case L2: p* < PL < hL < IL With the deviant firm charging successively PL, hL, and IL,
 the constraints analogous to (12), (13), and (14) are:
 a, + 2a nH < FL/S(PL - CL), (15)
 a, < FL/S(hL - CL), (16)
 at ? FL/(IL - CL) (17)
 Case L3: p* < PL < IL < hL. The relevant constraints are:
 a?< FL/S(hL - CL), (18)
 al + 2a nH <FL/S(PL -CL), (19)
 a, ? FL/I(IL - CL) (20)
 o Deviations by high quality firms. Suppose that all low quality firms charge pL* and
 all high quality firms except one charge pH. The deviant firm has three pricing options,
 analogous to the low quality deviant analyzed above; it can charge P-H, 1H, or hH.
 Case HI: pH* < IH < PH < hH-
 a, + 2a2fnL < FH/I(IH - CH), (21)
 al + 2a2fnL < FH/S(PH - CH), (22)
 aH< ' FH/I(hH - CH)- (23)
 Case H2: pH < PH < IH < hH-
 a, ? FH/I(IH - CH), (24)
 a, + 2a2fnL < FH/S(PH CH), (25)
 al < FH/S(hH - CH)- (26)
 Case H3: PH < PH < hH < IH-
 al ? FH/I(IH CH), (27)
 a1 + 2a HnL < FH/( -H CH), (28)
 a 1 ? FH/S( hH -CH)- (29 )
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 The constraints reflected in equations (1 5)-(29) are roughly analogous to the single
 constraint derived in Wilde and Schwartz (1979) for the homogeneous search goods
 case. Together with equation (11), these constraints provide a set of necessary and
 sufficient conditions for the competitive distribution of firms at (PL, PH), defined by (8)
 and (9), to be an equilibrium; that is, they provide a set of necessary and sufficient
 conditions for a competitive outcome in both markets.
 5. An analysis of the breaking constraints: the relevance of
 product heterogeneity
 * The markets for low and high quality goods interact in two distinct ways. First, a
 member of A2 can spill over "completely" into the market for high quality goods if both
 of his or her observations are taken at firms which offer only the high quality good. Such
 a member of A L is effectively a comparison shopper in the market for high quality goods.
 A member of AfH similarly can spill over completely into the market for low quality
 goods. This complete spillover has less effect on the equilibrium that will obtain than
 a "partial" spillover: a member of A2 can spill over "partially" into the market for high
 quality goods if precisely one of his or her observations is taken at a firm which offers
 the high quality good. Such a member of A2 is effectively a nonshopper in both markets.
 A member of A H similarly can spill over partially into the market for low quality goods.
 Partial spillover is another term for the dilution in the effectiveness of search that product
 heterogeneity creates. As an example, let Al = 0 so that all consumers are shoppers.
 Even in this case, a competitive equilibrium may not obtain for either good because,
 although everyone shops, some nonshoppers will inevitably exist in both markets.
 Partial spillover helps explain the nature of the breaking constraints. Equations
 (15)-(29) reveal two kinds of breaking constraints, those that only include terms as-
 sociated with nonshoppers (al, a L, or aH) on the left-hand side, and those that include
 additional terms associated with shoppers (a L or asH) on the left-hand side. The effect
 of changes in consumer shopping patterns on the likelihood that a competitive equilibrium
 will obtain is sensitive to which type of constraint is actually binding. To see why, we
 first increase the proportion of shoppers in such a way as to keep NL and NH constant.
 This is called a "balanced" change in shoppers. Second, we hold the total proportion of
 shoppers constant, but shift consumers between A L and A H. This is called an "unbal-
 anced" change in shoppers.
 o Balanced changes in shoppers. Define K1 = a2- a2s. Suppose that a2 increases subject
 to two conditions; K1 remains constant and neither a1L nor a1H rises (i.e., we allow no
 absolute redistribution between AtL and AH). Then from (8) and (10), nL = [l/(aL2
 - a2 )] - [SH/(SL - SH)I and from (9) and (10), nH [SL/(SL SH)]
 - [1/(aL - a2 )], so that
 (anL/Oa2 IK, = 0 = (OnH/Oa2)IK-
 Hence s = nLSL + nHSH is constant with respect to balanced changes in shoppers. When
 the operative constraints on both kinds of firms do not include terms associated with
 shoppers, a balanced increase in shoppers will never increase the left-hand side of these
 constraints and will usually lower it, since the increase in aL and af comes at the expense
 of aL and a H. This implies that a decrease in the number of nonshoppers makes a
 competitive equilibrium more likely to occur in both markets. Respecting the intuition
 behind this result, the operative constraints fail to include aL and afH only when the price
 that maximizes profits for a deviant firm necessarily eliminates all shoppers from con-
 sideration. In such a case, that product heterogeneity can dilute the effectiveness of
 search is irrelevant; the deviant firm sells only to nonshoppers, and when their number
 is reduced, it can become unprofitable for the firm to deviate. This yields:
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 Proposition 1: If the operative constraints on both types of firm are independent of a2
 and as', a balanced increase (decrease) in shoppers that does not increase (decrease)
 either aL or a' increases (decreases) the likelihood that both markets are competitive.
 Next let the operative constraints on both kinds of firms include a L or a'f and initially
 consider low quality firms. Most constraints which include a L or a' take the form a,
 + 2aLnH on the left-hand side. The term 2a LnH is associated with partial spillovers; it
 only arises when the price associated with the operative constraint is less than or equal
 to the switchprice for consumers who prefer low quality (P-L). When a deviant low quality
 firm charges a price above the competitive price but equal to or below the switchprice,
 it retains those members of A L who have partially spilled over into the market for high
 quality. As long as the price it charges is less than or equal to min {IL, hL}, it also retains
 all members of A'. The increase in a L makes it more likely that the firm will wish to
 deviate from p*, because of the effect of partial spillovers, but the decrease in a, makes
 such a motivation less likely. In this case, the latter effect dominates because a2Ls
 weighted by nH and balanced increases do not affect nL or nH. When the price that the
 deviant low quality firm charges is greater than min {IL, hL}, (e.g., case L2, pL* < PL
 < hL < IL), the net effect is ambiguous, depending on the extent to which the decrease
 in a, comes at the expense of afL or aH. A similar discussion applies to possible deviations
 by high quality firms. We thus have the following proposition:
 Proposition 2: If the operative constraints on both types of firms depend on a2L or a2,
 and pLD and pD are defined as the prices that maximize profits for deviant firms, then
 (i) p- < min {IL, hL} and PH < min {IH, hH} imply that a balanced increase (decrease)
 in shoppers will make it more (less) likely that both markets are competitive, and (ii)
 PLD > min {IL, hL} and pD > min {IH, hH} imply that a balanced increase in shoppers has
 ambiguous effects on the likelihood of a competitive equilibrium's occurring. Propositions
 1 and 2 imply that balanced increases in shoppers generally tend to make it more likely
 that both markets are competitive.
 o Unbalanced changes in shoppers. Unbalanced changes in a L and afH induce changes
 in the mix of low and high quality firms. To begin to understand the effect of these
 changes, suppose that SL > SH and consider an increase in a L that comes entirely at the
 expense of a '; that is, a L and arH are held constant, while some shoppers shift from the
 group that prefers high quality to the group that prefers low quality. Define K2 = a2
 + a2 . It is straightforward to show that
 (anL/aaj)K2 < 0 and (anHlaaL) K2 > O.
 These derivatives imply that s must decrease, since we have assumed that SL > SH.
 Constraints that do not depend on a2L or a2H are more likely to be satisfied i.e.,
 deviations from the competitive price are less likely when the increase in a L is unbal-
 anced. This results because such a shift both increases the proportion of shoppers who
 are predisposed to buy low quality and decreases the number of low quality firms. Unless
 more of the shoppers who prefer low quality spill over totally into the market for high
 quality, excess demand will occur in the low quality market. To avoid this disequilibrium
 phenomenon i.e., to facilitate total spillovers the number of high quality firms must
 increase. When high quality firms are assumed to have lower capacity, the equilibrium
 consumer firm ratio thus must also decline. Such a decline makes deviations from com-
 petitive prices less profitable for firms that would depend only on the business of non-
 shoppers after the price rise, since with a lowered consumer firm ratio, each firm has
 fewer expected customers, including fewer nonshoppers, and so is less equipped to with-
 stand loss of patronage. This leads to the following proposition:
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 Proposition 3: If SL > SH and the operative constraints on both types of firms are in-
 dependent of aL and a H, an unbalanced increase in aL(a H) will increase (decrease) the
 likelihood that both markets are competitive.
 When the operative constraints on both types of firms do depend on a2 or a2s, it can
 be shown that:
 (OA(ai + 2a2nH)/a2 )IK2 = (OS(af + 2a2nH)/a2 )IK2 > 0
 and
 (Os(ai + 2a2nL)/Oa2jIK2 = (o?(ar + 2a2nL)/Oa2 IK2 < 0.
 These derivatives imply that an unbalanced increase in aL will make it less likely that
 the market for low quality goods is competitive and more likely that the market for high
 quality goods is competitive. This is a somewhat startling result.
 To see why it obtains, observe that the operative constraint for low quality deviants
 depends on aL if and only if the price that maximizes profits for the deviant firm is less
 than or equal to the switchprice PL. In this case, partial spillover matters. Furthermore,
 while a shift from af to aL increases the number of comparison shoppers who prefer the
 low quality good, it also increases the number of these consumers who will take only one
 observation in the market for low quality goods because some members of AL will partially
 spill over into the other market. A firm offering the low quality good which wishes to
 deviate from pL knows that it will lose all comparison shoppers but get all nonshoppers.
 Because of partial spillovers, the number of nonshoppers in the low quality market
 actually increases when aL increases entirely at the expense of a H. Thus, a firm offering
 the low quality good is more likely to deviate from pL. In the market for high quality
 goods, as af decreases, the number of shoppers who will take only one observation in
 the market for high quality goods declines. So does the number of shoppers in this market
 who prefer high quality goods and take both observations in it. But from the point of
 view of a firm offering the high quality good, fewer nonshoppers exist as a result of the
 decline in asH. Thus, this firm will find it less profitable to deviate from p* and will be
 less likely to do so. In consequence, when a2 increases entirely at the expense of a2, a
 competitive equilibrium in the market for low quality goods is less likely to occur while
 a competitive equilibrium in the market for high quality goods is more likely to occur.
 This yields a final proposition:
 Proposition 4: If SL > SH and the operative constraints on both types of firms depend
 on a2 or a2, then an unbalanced increase (decrease) in aL will decrease (increase) the
 likelihood that the market for low quality goods is competitive and will increase (decrease)
 the likelihood-that the market for high quality goods is competitive.
 6. Policy implications and limitations of the analysis
 * Heterogeneity dilutes the effectiveness of search because a consumer could take one
 observation in each of two markets and consequently be a nonshopper in both. This result
 derives from a model that allows but two qualities and two store visits. If the number
 of qualities is increased, holding sample size constant, the dilution effect is exacerbated
 and competitive equilibria become less likely. Thus our model reinforces Satterthwaite
 (1979), who showed in a very different analytical framework how an increase in the
 number of sellers of a differentiated service could cause prices for that service to rise.
 Respecting increases in the number of shoppers or in search intensity, holding quality
 levels constant, we showed that when firms are charging prices high enough to attract
 only nonshoppers-"monopoly prices" an increase in the number of shoppers is likely
 to cause prices to fall. If firms are charging prices intermediate between monopoly and
 competitive prices, matters are less straightforward. This results because in the model
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 above an increase in the number of shoppers can be decomposed into "balanced" and
 "unbalanced" increases, and some unbalanced increases can decrease the likelihood of
 competitive equilibria obtaining in one of the markets (see Proposition 4). This result,
 however, depends importantly on the shoppers' having a sample size of only two. If
 sample sizes were to increase, shoppers would be more likely to take enough observations
 in at least one market to be comparison shoppers in it, despite any observations they
 may also have made in the other market. Given that an increase in the number of
 consumers who shop could have anticompetitive effects only in a minority of cases even
 with the smallest sample size possible (see Propositions 1-3), this analysis suggests that
 increases in the number of shoppers or in search intensity will generally make competitive
 equilibria more likely.
 From a policy viewpoint, it is easier and wiser to influence the extent and intensity
 of search than to influence firm entry. Thus the state should seriously consider reducing
 the costs to consumers of directly comparing purchase alternatives in markets that are
 badly behaved for information reasons.9 Recent evidence supports this view. Devine and
 Marion (1979) provided consumers with some comparative price information and with
 a weighted index of prices on 65 common food items for supermarkets in a Canadian
 city for a five-week period. A weighted index of supermarket prices is analogous to a
 single price for a heterogeneous good. Prices in the sample market declined substantially,
 and price dispersion decreased during the experimental period, while prices and dispersion
 were largely unaffected in the control market.'0 Also, search intensity apparently in-
 creased. In addition, the Devine and Marion study tentatively suggested that the gain
 in consumer surplus from these price declines exceeded the sum of the program's ad-
 ministrative costs and the decline in producer surplus. Thus, reducing the costs of com-
 parison shopping in badly behaved consumer markets seems a useful policy option.
 We also show that plausible circumstances exist in which heterogeneous goods mar-
 kets will segment into homogeneous subsets. These circumstances occur when consumers
 will not purchase their less preferred quality, or when consumers' marginal willingness
 to buy high quality does not bear that particular relationship to the marginal cost of
 high quality that is required for the two markets to interact. If quality density increases
 significantly, segmentation is less likely because consumers may be willing to purchase
 products that are quite close to their first choices. A large number of closely related
 qualities would seem necessary for this effect to be significant. Also, the likelihood of
 segmentation varies directly with increases in search intensity, since the more observa-
 tions a consumer makes, the more likely he is to be a comparative shopper only for his
 most preferred quality.
 From a policy viewpoint, decisionmakers can simplify the task of deciding when an
 intervention on information grounds is necessary by adopting a presumption of segmen-
 tation when segmentation seems intuitively plausible that is, when physically distinct
 products trade at different prices. The simplification occurs because it is easier to decide
 9 We suggest that the state should increase the number of searchers and search intensity by reducing the
 costs to consumers of directly comparing purchase alternatives. For example, comparative price information
 could be made widely available. Such a policy prescription is to be distinguished from proposals that would
 provide consumers with "institutional knowledge" of the sort: "Only firms A, B, and C sell high quality."
 Providing consumers with institutional knowledge alone would be unwise, because some consumers could get
 trapped in the wrong market. To see how, suppose that a consumer with such knowledge perceives himself to
 prefer high quality before he begins to shop, and thus plans to sample only high quality firms. This consumer
 could end up paying his limit price for a high quality item, whereas, if he shopped randomly, he might have
 seen a low quality good selling at its competitive price, which in many cases would be preferred to buying a
 high quality good at the limit price.
 10 Other empirical studies also report price declines following induced reductions in the cost to consumers
 of directly comparing purchase alternatives. See McNeil, Nevin, Trubeck, and Miller (1979) (used cars); Russo,
 Kreiser, and Miyashita (1975) (dishwashing liquid, canned dog food, facial tissues).
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 what is going on in markets for (roughly) homogeneous goods. It may be that the saving
 in administrative costs from presuming segmentation could outweigh the errors that such
 presumptions always cause.
 The positive and normative implications of our model should be qualified in three
 respects. First, the model only characterizes competitive equilibria; thus criteria cannot
 be formally derived from it that would enable decisionmakers better to recognize when
 heterogeneous goods markets are behaving badly. Second, we assume that consumers
 are aware of quality differences before they begin to search. Shopping, however, some-
 times performs an educative function, in which persons learn about market options as
 they go along. Markets of this kind might be less well behaved than the markets described
 above, since search is more likely to involve wasted effort, but in the absence of formal
 analysis it is difficult to know. Third, we dealt with a heterogeneous search good, but
 many goods, including some used in our intuitive explanations, have important experience
 aspects. Whether our conclusions are applicable in these cases again is an open question.
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